The new bill No. 13260 closes the “window of opportunity” for unauthorized absence from military service. Why didn’t the previous changes work, and what risks await service members?

The Verkhovna Rada has made another attempt to address the issue of unauthorized absence from duty by passing Bill No. 13260 in its first reading. This bill is intended to correct the mistakes of previous legislative initiatives, which—despite loud slogans about “decriminalization”—not only failed to solve the problem but may have actually exacerbated it. According to some lawmakers and military officials, a year of populism and misguided decisions has led to an increase in the number of AWOL cases and negatively impacted mobilization.

Let’s try to understand what the new bill proposes, why previous mechanisms proved ineffective, and what risks military personnel actually faced when using the simplified return procedure.

1. The Essence of the Changes in Bill No. 13260: Closing the “Window of Opportunity”

An analysis of the comparative table accompanying the bill indicates the legislature’s intention to radically change the approach to liability for unauthorized absence from service and desertion (Articles 407 and 408 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine).

The key proposed change is the repeal of Part 5 of Article 401 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine. It was precisely this provision that served as the legal basis for exempting military personnel from criminal liability if they committed an act of insubordination for the first time during martial law and expressed a desire to return to service.

Instead, the legislature proposes to introduce a temporary mechanism into the Final and Transitional Provisions of the Criminal Code of Ukraine (paragraph 24), which will have retroactive effect and apply only to offenses committed before the new law takes effect.

Exemption from liability will be possible in two cases:

1. If a service member committed a disciplinary offense for the first time before the law was enacted and, during the pretrial investigation or trial, filed a motion stating their intention to return to service with the commander’s consent.

2. If a service member committed a disciplinary offense for the first time before the law was enacted, voluntarily returned to their unit, and subsequently served for at least three months. This provision effectively legalizes the status of those who have already taken advantage of the simplified return procedures that have been in effect since August 2024.

Thus, following the final adoption of Bill No. 13260, any new cases of desertion will not be subject to special conditions for exemption from liability, which means a return to the full criminalization of these acts.

2. Poor timing and inaction: two reasons for the failure of previous reforms

Although, according to the head of the State Bureau of Investigation, more than 29,000 military personnel returned to the armed forces between November 2024 and August 2025, this figure does not reflect the true scale of the problem.

The previous version of the law failed to serve as an effective tool for mass reinstatement for two key reasons.

Reason One: A Fatal Communication Error and Misuse of Terms

From the very beginning, the authorities and leading media outlets misinterpreted the legislative changes, referring to them as the “decriminalization of desertion.” This created an extremely dangerous illusion that deserting one’s unit was no longer a crime. In reality, however, what was introduced was not decriminalization but the institution of exemption from criminal liability—a complex legal procedure that:

• Does not negate the fact that a crime was committed.
• Requires mandatory court proceedings.
• Leaves it to the court’s discretion—not an obligation—to decide on exemption.

This substitution of concepts had the opposite effect: instead of serving as an incentive to return, it sent a signal of impunity, which only led to an increase in the number of cases of absconding.

Reason Two: System Paralysis Due to the Inaction of the State Bureau of Investigations

The mechanism for exemption from liability itself was practically inoperative due to the systemic inaction of the State Bureau of Investigations. The exemption procedure could only be initiated within the framework of a registered criminal proceeding. The prosecutor had to file a motion with the court after obtaining the consent of the suspect and the unit commander.

However, practice shows that the State Bureau of Investigations registers only a tiny fraction of reports of self-defense. For example, according to an official response from one of the military units, 1,856 cases of self-defense were recorded between March and December 2024. At the same time, the unit received only 108 extracts from the Unified Register of Pre-trial Investigations (URPI) from the State Bureau of Investigations. This represents less than 6% of the total number of reports.

The absence of information in the Unified Register of Pre-trial Investigations means there was no pre-trial investigation. Without it, a servicemember—even if he wanted to return through legal channels—simply could not do so. He did not have the status of a suspect and did not know which investigator or prosecutor to contact, since legally his case did not exist. The mechanism outlined in the law came up against a wall of institutional failure.

3. “Army+”: Simplified Return or Postponed Accountability?

The simplified return mechanism proposed by the authorities via the “Army+” app was presented as a quick and effective solution. A servicemember would submit a report, arrive at the Military Service Department, and be reinstated to service in a reserve unit.

However, this path is extremely risky for the servicemember himself.

The main problem is that the administrative procedure for reinstatement via

“Army+” does not suspend or annul criminal proceedings related to desertion. The unit’s command is required to report the crime to the State Bureau of Investigation (DBR). The fact of voluntary return does not eliminate the elements of the crime provided for in Articles 407 or 408 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine.

Thus, a paradoxical situation arose: a soldier would return to duty, carry out combat missions, while the criminal proceedings against him could continue to be investigated. At any moment, he could be served with a notice of suspicion, and the case could be referred to court.

From a criminal law perspective, this approach is entirely correct. The crime provided for in Article 407 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine is considered complete from the moment of unauthorized absence from the unit or failure to report for duty. In other words, the elements of the crime are already present. Subsequent voluntary return constitutes positive post-criminal conduct, which does not negate the fact that a crime was committed but is an important mitigating factor taken into account by the court. That is precisely why the law provided not for the automatic dismissal of the case, but for a special judicial procedure for exemption from liability. The investigation must continue to establish all the circumstances, and the soldier’s return is only one of them—albeit a key one for possible exemption from punishment.

The only legal way to avoid punishment was the procedure for exemption from liability through the courts. But, as noted above, this procedure was virtually ineffective. Moreover, even if a case is heard, the court is not obligated to automatically exempt a person from liability—it is within the court’s discretion.

Thus, the proposed mechanism was not so much a real solution to the problem as a trap that created an illusion of security for military personnel, while leaving them at risk of criminal prosecution in the future.

The solution to the problem of the Special Forces lies not in tactical legislative maneuvers, but in addressing more strategic issues.