In the context of a full-scale war, the idea of strengthening legal protections for national identity seems logical. For decades, Russian propaganda has used anti-Ukrainian sentiment as a tool to dehumanize Ukrainians, justify aggression, and undermine the Ukrainian state’s sovereignty. However, it is not the goal itself but the means of achieving it that raise objections.
What exactly does Bill No. 15186 propose?
As reported by “ZiB,” on April 22, 2026, People’s Deputy Mykola Knyazhitsky registered a bill in the Verkhovna Rada “On Amending Article 161 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine Regarding the Establishment of Liability for Ukrainophobia” (No. 15186).
It does not simply add a new term to Article 161 of the Criminal Code, but introduces into criminal law a new evaluative category based on vague concepts, which largely duplicates existing offenses and poses serious risks to freedom of speech, legal certainty, and European standards.
The changes are specific. The phrase “manifestations of Ukrainophobia” is added to the operative part of Part 1 of Article 161 of the Criminal Code. In a note to the article, a legal definition of this concept appears for the first time in Ukrainian criminal law.
According to the text, “manifestations of Ukrainophobia” are understood to mean intentional actions aimed at inciting national enmity and hatred, humiliating national honor and dignity, as well as publicly denying the Ukrainian nation’s right to self-determination, sovereignty, and statehood. These actions may take, in particular, three forms:
public calls (including through the media, in literary or artistic works) to deny the status of the Ukrainian state or the Ukrainian nation as a subject of international law;
justifying the subjugation, exploitation, or assimilation of the Ukrainian people, as well as denying the legitimacy of the struggle for independence, the protection of the political, economic, and cultural rights of the Ukrainian people, and the development of Ukrainian statehood, science, and culture;
in publicly disparaging distinctive ethnocultural characteristics or discrediting the Ukrainian language and culture with the aim of undermining national identity.
The penalty remains unchanged—a fine ranging from 200 to 500 non-taxable minimum incomes, restriction of liberty for up to 5 years, or imprisonment for up to three years.
Current legislation already covers a significant portion of these acts
The first thing that stands out upon a systematic analysis of the draft is the absence of any real legal loophole that supposedly needs to be closed.
Article 161 of the Criminal Code, in its current version, already criminalizes intentional acts aimed at inciting national enmity and hatred, as well as at humiliating national honor and dignity. Judicial practice in recent years demonstrates that this provision has been successfully applied precisely to anti-Ukrainian statements—including those that justify aggression and contain ethnophobic language.
Moreover, a number of other articles of the Criminal Code already cover actions that the draft law attempts to label as “Ukrainophobia”:
Article 109 of the Criminal Code—public calls for the violent overthrow of the constitutional order;
Article 110 of the Criminal Code—encroachment on territorial integrity, including when combined with incitement of national enmity (aggravated offense);
Article 1111 of the Criminal Code (collaboration)—public denial of armed aggression against Ukraine, calls to support the aggressor state;
Article 4362 of the Criminal Code—justifying, recognizing as lawful, or denying the Russian Federation’s armed aggression against Ukraine; glorifying its participants, including through the production and dissemination of materials.
Taken together, the objective elements of these offenses cover virtually the entire spectrum of acts that the bill classifies as “Ukrainophobia.” The real problem lies not in the absence of a legal provision, but in its fragmentary nature and the internal conflict between the various elements of the offenses. The proposed amendments do not eliminate this fragmentation; rather, they exacerbate it.
Problem One: Evaluative Concepts as the Basis for Criminal Liability
The principle of legal certainty in criminal law (nullum crimen sine lege certa) is not a theoretical construct but a requirement of Article 7 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and established practice of the European Court of Human Rights. An individual must be able to understand in advance exactly which actions constitute a crime. The proposed text does not meet this standard.
“Public contempt for distinctive ethnocultural characteristics”
The concept of “distinctive ethnocultural characteristics” is not defined either in the draft law or in any other act of Ukrainian legislation. What does this include—language, rituals, national dress, cuisine, historical narratives, or religious traditions? Who will determine “authenticity,” and by what criteria? Academic discussions about the origins of a particular custom or criticism of language policy formally fall into the risk zone.
“Discrediting the Ukrainian language and culture with the aim of undermining national identity”
Three evaluative terms in a row. “Discrediting” is not legally distinguished from “criticism.” “Undermining national identity” is a category of political philosophy, not law. The purpose of such undermining is a subjective category that is extremely difficult to prove and even more difficult to refute.
“Denial of the legitimacy of the struggle for independence”
This wording puts even academic discussions of specific historical events, figures, or tactical decisions in the national liberation struggle at risk. A historian who critically evaluates a specific episode formally falls within the scope of potential criminal prosecution.
“Public denial of the statehood of Ukraine or the Ukrainian nation”
Without a clear definition of “subjectivity,” the provision allows any statement that calls into question specific government decisions, political institutions, or models of statehood to be classified as a crime.
By comparison: although the current Article 161 of the Criminal Code contains evaluative elements (“inciting hostility,” “defamation”), it has an established doctrinal interpretation and decades of judicial practice, including European case law. The proposed terms, however, lack any legal precedent—and it will be the investigator, prosecutor, and court who will be the first to figure out what they mean.
Problem Two: Conflicting Provisions and a “Menu” for the Investigator
Criminal law is based on the principle: one act—one offense. Certain exceptions (in particular, ideal concurrence) only confirm this general rule. When the legislature introduces a new provision that partially duplicates an existing one, a conflict between criminal law provisions arises—and in practice, it must be resolved at the discretion of the investigator and the prosecutor.
Let’s consider a specific example. A citizen posts a message on social media in which he denies the existence of the Ukrainian nation as a distinct entity and justifies the Russian invasion of 2022. Under which provision should this be classified:
under Article 161 of the Criminal Code (as amended) as a “manifestation of Ukrainophobia”—up to 3 years of imprisonment;
under Part 1 of Article 1111 of the Criminal Code as public denial of armed aggression—disqualification from holding public office for 10–15 years;
under Article 4362 of the Criminal Code as justification of the Russian Federation’s armed aggression—up to 3 years of imprisonment (up to 8 years for disseminating materials);
under Part 2 of Article 110 of the Criminal Code—5 to 10 years of imprisonment?
The possibility that the same act could be classified under articles carrying penalties ranging from a fine to 10 years of imprisonment, depending on the discretion of the pretrial investigation authority, is a classic sign of legal uncertainty. The choice of classification becomes a tool that can be used both for and against the suspect. The principle of equality before the law becomes nothing more than a declaration in such a framework.
Problem Three: Social Media, Reposts, and an Uncomfortable Comparison
The wording regarding public calls “using the media, in literary or artistic works, etc.” deserves special attention. Given that social media is legally equated with the media, and judicial practice unequivocally recognizes social media posts as a means of committing information-related
crimes, this implies one fundamental thing: the provision is directly aimed at statements made by ordinary users. Reposting an old text, quoting from a book, making a comment, or sharing a work of art—all of this can be classified as a “manifestation of Ukrainophobia” if an investigator perceives it as “discrediting” or “disrespect.”
Here, a comparative observation must be made—one that is unpleasant but professionally unavoidable. In the aggressor state, a widespread practice of criminal prosecution for statements and reposts on social media has developed in recent years, based on provisions structured according to an almost identical model: broad, subjective concepts such as “discrediting,” “undermining” certain values, and “offending sensibilities”—without clear criteria and with a wide margin for interpretation. The Ukrainian media has rightly ridiculed—and continues to ridicule—this approach as a tool of repression against dissent.
This makes it all the more important not to replicate this logic in our own legislation, even with the best of intentions. A provision written to combat an enemy may, once the political climate changes, be applied in an entirely different way—and that is precisely why its structure must be safeguarded against abuse at the level of the text itself, rather than relying on hopes for the conscientious application of the law.
Problem Four: The Test for Compatibility with Article 10 of the Convention
The European Court of Human Rights has consistently
adhered to the position that restrictions on freedom of expression are permissible only if the provision is “clearly foreseeable” and “strictly necessary in a democratic society.” Each of the discretionary provisions in the draft law poses a high risk of the restriction being deemed disproportionate.
This is not a theoretical concern. Ukraine, which is actively moving toward membership in the European Union, will inevitably face an assessment of this provision by European institutions. Any high-profile conviction for “discrediting culture” or “disrespect for ethnocultural characteristics” will have a high likelihood of being reviewed in Strasbourg—with a predictable outcome in favor of the applicant. Paradoxically, a law supposedly enacted to strengthen the nation-state could lead to a series of international rulings against it.
Conclusion: Right Goal, Wrong Legal Framework
Ukrainian lawmakers face a real challenge—the need to strengthen legal protection against enemy information operations. However, Bill No. 15186 does not offer a solution to this problem but rather a mere imitation of one by introducing a new evaluative category that largely duplicates existing norms, lacks legal certainty, and creates broad discretion for law enforcement agencies.
If Parliament truly seeks to strengthen criminal law protection of national identity, the path forward lies not in introducing the vague term “Ukrainophobia,” but in:
clarifying the provisions of the current Article 161 of the Criminal Code by adding specific, legally defined forms of conduct;
harmonizing Articles 161, 109, 110, 1111, and 4362 of the Criminal Code to eliminate conflicting provisions and clearly distinguish the grounds for classification;
establishing specific criteria for distinguishing public statements from criminally punishable acts, taking into account the standards of the European Court of Human Rights;
rejecting evaluative concepts such as “discrediting,” “undermining identity,” and “distinctive ethno-cultural characteristics” in favor of legally defined categories;
clearly distinguishing the spheres of science, education, journalism, and the arts from the scope of criminal law.
In its current form, the bill risks creating more legal problems than it solves. Effective protection of Ukrainian society against information threats is achieved not by expanding the list of vague criminal prohibitions, but through precise wording, consistent law enforcement, and trust in the legal system. None of these challenges is addressed by passing a law that will be equally vague for both a prosecutor and a person who posted a message on social media.
Specific actions—not a vaguely defined worldview—must be criminalized. This is the difference between a state governed by the rule of law and a mere imitation of it.
Author: Vitaliy Chayun, Barrister
Source: https://zib.com.ua/ua/172330-kriminalizaciya_ukrainofobii_zahist_identichnosti_chi_nebezp.html