During a recent criminal law forum, the Prosecutor General announced a series of initiatives that are intended to form the foundation of criminal policy for the coming years. These include a radical increase in penalties for crimes against children and changes to the rules governing the involvement of businesses in criminal proceedings.

As a lawyer, I cannot deny the need to improve legislation, as the law must keep pace with the challenges of our time. However, an analysis of the principles underlying these changes—specifically draft laws No. 12439 and No. 14124—raises legitimate skepticism. The issue is not the conceptual need for change, but rather what specific model of justice is being imposed on us under the banner of efficiency.

Reform of Article 214 of the Code of Criminal Procedure: Legalizing Subjectivity Under the Guise of “Business Protection”

The first set of issues concerns the registration of information in the Unified Register of Pre-trial Investigations. Bill No. 12439 (“On Amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine Regarding the Improvement of Guarantees for the Protection of Business Entities”) proposes changing the fundamental paradigm: instead of the obligation to enter information based on “circumstances that may indicate the commission of a crime,” a requirement for the existence of “sufficient evidence” is introduced.

Let’s look at this through the lens of history. Even the old Criminal Procedure Code of 1960, which we are accustomed to criticizing for its Soviet-style punitive nature, provided for a mechanism of preliminary investigation. Yes, it was far from ideal, but it at least provided minimal procedural safeguards: law enforcement officers had to gather information, interview individuals, and obtain facts before issuing a ruling. The innovation being promoted by Prosecutor Kravchenko, however, does not restore the preliminary investigation—it simply legalizes pure subjectivity. An investigator or prosecutor gains the right to “pre-screen” a complaint on their own, without taking any concrete steps to verify the report. With a single stroke of the pen, an official will be able to decide that the evidence is “insufficient,” and your complaint will simply disappear into the archives without any consequences for the potential criminal.

Here we run into a serious logical contradiction. In recent years, judicial practice has already steered the process toward the selective inclusion of information. Investigating judges routinely reject complaints regarding failure to enter information into the Unified Register of Pre-trial Investigations if, in their opinion, the complaint lacks circumstances that “may indicate” a crime. So the question arises: if the courts have already established this filter de facto, why drag it into the Code de jure?

Conversely, if changes are being proposed to introduce the principle that “not everything is subject to entry,” then we must acknowledge that, as the law stands today, it requires the entry of everything. If the investigator already has the right to “assess” anyway, why change the law? This legislative balancing act around “sufficiency” is merely an attempt by the law enforcement system to avoid having to justify its inaction before the court.

The role of the Prosecutor General in business-related cases is a particular cause for concern. The proposal that cases involving private-sector economic activity (in particular, under Article 191 of the Criminal Code) be registered exclusively with the approval of the prosecutor’s office leadership appears to create a “bottleneck.” Instead of an automated system, we are getting manual control. This is not protection for entrepreneurs from pressure; it is the centralization of influence, where the key to entering the criminal process lies in the pocket of a single official.

At the same time, an important aspect is being ignored: currently, the vast majority of entries in the Unified Register of Pre-trial Investigations under Article 191 of the Criminal Code are made by law enforcement agencies themselves based on “their independent discovery of circumstances from any source.” Consequently, changes in this regard will in no way reduce the number of criminal proceedings, the necessity of which the prosecutor so actively emphasizes. The attempt to justify the reform as a fight against unfounded claims by “competitors” does not stand up to scrutiny, since the lion’s share of the pressure on businesses is generated by law enforcement agencies themselves, not by private complaints.

Life Imprisonment: Between Repression and the Istanbul Convention

The second set of reforms concerns Bill No. 14124, which proposes mandatory life imprisonment for a wide range of crimes against children (amendments to Articles 115, 121, 152, 153, 156, and 303 of the Criminal Code). Undoubtedly, the protection of children is the highest priority. But is a purely repressive approach effective, or is it simply a convenient tool for sensational headlines?

The proposed mandatory nature of the punishment effectively nullifies the principle of individualization enshrined in the Constitution. Judges lose the ability to assess the degree of danger to society and the motives in each specific case. Furthermore, lawmakers are being somewhat disingenuous when they claim that the current Criminal Code lacks severe sanctions. Life imprisonment for the murder of a child is already possible today. The issue is not the absence of a law, but the system’s ability to enforce it.

The key message that should come from the Office of the Prosecutor General is not the severity of the punishment, but its inevitability and its real deterrent effect. International experience—in particular, the Istanbul Convention, which Ukraine has ratified—teaches us otherwise. Article 16 of the Convention explicitly requires states to establish or maintain programs aimed at teaching perpetrators to behave in a non-discriminatory manner and to prevent repeat offenses. Article 15 requires appropriate training for professionals working with such individuals.

Moreover, we must recognize that the perpetrators of the crimes for which mandatory life imprisonment is proposed are often individuals who have reached

the age of 14. In other words, minors themselves are potentially subject to the “highest measure” of punishment.

The psychology behind crimes committed by adolescents differs fundamentally from the motivations of adult offenders. Between the ages of 14 and 16, the psyche is still developing: a lack of life experience, impulsivity, heightened suggestibility, and an inability to fully comprehend the long-term consequences of one’s actions render a harsh punitive model completely ineffective.

From a psychological perspective, an adolescent who has committed a serious crime is most often the result of a systemic failure in upbringing, social environment, or undiagnosed psychological trauma. Depriving such a child of any chance to reintegrate into society—condemning them to lifelong isolation—is not justice, but an admission of the state’s failure. International standards of juvenile justice insist that the goal of punishing minors should be precisely their rehabilitation and resocialization. Corrective measures and work with psychologists in the early stages can change the course of a person’s life, whereas life imprisonment merely perpetuates aggression and leads to “social death.”

The fight against sexual violence is based on evidence-based treatment programs and corrective measures. The severity of a punishment does not deter an offender as much as the understanding that the system is watching them and will not allow them to reoffend. Instead of populism, we need mandatory psychological rehabilitation programs, specialized registries, and expanded powers for probation officers to monitor a convict’s life after release. Simply “locking up” a person behind bars forever is the easiest response to society’s demand for justice, but it does not protect the next child from a potential crime in the future. This is precisely what Prosecutor Kravchenko should be insisting on if his goal is safety, not just reporting metrics.

 And in conclusion. Once again, we are witnessing an attempt to solve systemic problems in the criminal justice system through isolated, forceful changes. The reform of crime registration looks like a step backward toward the subjectivism of the 1960s, while mandatory life sentences appear to be nothing more than noise. True reform is when the law operates automatically, without a “window” for the investigator’s discretion, and when public policy focuses on eradicating the causes of crime, rather than merely on the superficial severity of the consequences.