The European Court of Human Rights has decided to forward the petition filed by Alexander Tananakin, an attorney with BARRISTERS Law Firm, to the Government of Ukraine in the case of Neli Shtepa, the former mayor of Sloviansk.

The European Court of Human Rights has decided to forward the submission by Alexander Tananakin, an attorney with BARRISTERS Law Firm, to the Government of Ukraine in the case of Neli Shtepa, the former mayor of Sloviansk.

The Ukrainian government has been asked to address issues under Articles 5 (right to liberty) and 6 (right to a fair trial) of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.

Previously, the European Court of Human Rights had granted a request to examine this case on a priority basis.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The applicant, Ms. Nelia Ihorivna Shtepa, is a Ukrainian citizen born in 1962 and residing in Sloviansk. Her interests before the Court are represented by Mr. O.V. Tananakin, a lawyer practicing in Kyiv.

CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

The facts of the case, as presented by the applicant, may be summarized as follows.

The applicant served as mayor of Sloviansk from November 2010 to April 2014.

On July 12, 2014, criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicant under Article 110 § of the Criminal Code (Encroachment on State Sovereignty and Integrity).

On July 13, 2014, the Chervonozavodskyi District Court of Kharkiv issued a ruling ordering the applicant’s detention as a preventive measure in connection with the aforementioned proceedings. The ruling states that she is accused of committing a serious crime and that, otherwise, she might abscond and obstruct the investigation or continue her criminal activities. The court did not provide further details regarding the aforementioned grounds.

Meanwhile, additional charges were brought against the applicant under Article 258 § of the Criminal Code (terrorist act).

During the pretrial investigation and court proceedings, the courts extended the applicant’s pretrial detention a total of twenty times. In justifying the extension of the applicant’s pretrial detention, the courts cited the same grounds as those set forth in the court’s decision of July 13, 2014. In some decisions, the courts, without providing further details, additionally noted that:

• the applicant had not provided evidence confirming that the risks justifying her detention, which had previously been assessed by the courts, no longer applied to her;
• the applicant’s arguments in favor of her release did not outweigh the public interest in keeping her in custody;
• Article 176 § 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure prohibits the application of any preventive measures in her case other than pretrial detention.

On September 20, 2017, the court changed the applicant’s preventive measure to house arrest, releasing her from custody. The applicant did not provide the Court with a copy of this decision.

The criminal case against the applicant is still pending before the court.

According to the applicant, during the trial, nineteen judges who heard her case either recused themselves or were disqualified; or were dismissed, or took maternity or sick leave under pressure from the prosecution, or ended their careers entirely. As a result, the criminal proceedings against her were resumed four times.

APPLICABLE NATIONAL LEGISLATION

1. The 2012 Code of Criminal Procedure.

Article 176. General Provisions on Pre-Trial Measures.

Preventive measures include:

• personal undertaking;
• personal surety;
• bail;
• house arrest;
• detention.

Preventive measures of a personal nature, personal guarantees, house arrest, and release on bail may not be applied to persons suspected or accused of committing crimes under Article 110 § or Article 258 §  of the Criminal Code of Ukraine.

2. The Criminal Code of 2001.

Article 110 § of the Criminal Code provides that any actions aimed at altering the territory or state border, as well as public calls or the dissemination of materials containing calls for such activities, which have resulted in the loss of human life or other serious consequences, - shall be punishable by imprisonment for a term of ten to fifteen years or life imprisonment in the case of intentional acts committed by a public official, or repeat offenses, or those committed by a group of persons. The sentence may also be accompanied by the confiscation of the convicted person’s personal property.

Article 258, paragraph 2, of the Criminal Code provides for imprisonment for a term of seven to twelve years for a terrorist act committed as part of a conspiracy or for a terrorist act that caused significant material damage or other serious consequences. The sentence may also be accompanied by the confiscation of the convicted person’s personal property.

COMPLAINT

Relying on Article 3 § of the Convention, the applicant complains that:

• she was subjected to physical and psychological ill-treatment in places of detention;
• the material conditions of her detention were unsatisfactory;
• she was not provided with access to adequate medical care while in custody.

Relying on Article 5 § of the Convention, the applicant complains that the domestic court’s decision of July 14, 2014, to impose pretrial detention as a preventive measure, as well as the courts’ decisions to extend her pretrial detention until September 20, 2017, were arbitrary and unfounded.

The applicant also complains, under Article 5 § of the Convention, that her pretrial detention was unreasonably lengthy.

Furthermore, the applicant complains under Article 6 § of the Convention that the criminal proceedings against her were unreasonably lengthy.

Finally, relying on Articles 14 § and 18 § in conjunction with Article 5 § of the Convention, the applicant complains of discriminatory treatment aimed at isolating her from political activities while in custody.

QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES

1. Was the applicant’s detention from July 13, 2014, to September 20, 2017, free from arbitrariness and based on sufficient grounds for the purposes of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention? Is this compatible with the “reasonable time” requirement of the same provision (see Buzagi v. Moldova, 23755/07, §§ 84 et seq., July 5, 2016)?

2. Does the length of the criminal proceedings in this case constitute a violation of the “reasonable time” requirement set forth in Article 6(1) of the Convention (see 66561/01, §§ 72–76, March 30, 2004)?