It is probably no secret to anyone that the Russian Federation actively uses legal means to further its own aggression in universal and regional international jurisdictions, within the legal systems of the Russian Federation, third countries, and Ukraine itself. There has not yet been a comprehensive analysis of Russia’s actions and intentions within the framework of public discussions. Therefore, the expert discussion held on December 13, 2019, titled “The Legal War: The Ukrainian-Russian Context,” at the Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Policy and Interparliamentary Cooperation was of great importance. I am confident that, based on the outcomes of this discussion, members of parliament, representatives of relevant government agencies, business entities, and civil society organizations with experience in legally countering the aggressor will improve their coordination and the effectiveness of their work.

Based on the results of the event, I consider it appropriate to publish my own assessment of the main directions of the enemy’s legal activities against the Ukrainian people, which was presented during the aforementioned expert discussion. I believe that the Russian Federation’s primary legal actions within Ukrainian jurisdiction should include active participation—both through permissible means (such as hiring attorneys and representatives, and utilizing consular resources) as through corruption risks and the use of pro-Russian officials in law enforcement agencies and the judiciary in specific categories of legal proceedings.

First, these are proceedings in administrative courts concerning the alleged illegality of imposing sanctions against business entities and individuals. The challenges target sanctions decrees, orders implementing sanctions, and administrative decisions on these matters. Examples include the “fake Aksyonov” case, in which a doppelganger of the Crimean Gauleiter challenged a presidential decree; the blocking of the tanker “Mechanic Pogodin”; and the case of the Russian Maritime Register of Shipping, whose Ukrainian “subsidiary” managed for a time to have the sanctions against it lifted.

Second, there are “maritime” criminal proceedings concerning attempts to hold violators accountable for breaching the ban on commercial shipping to Crimea and to confiscate the relevant commercial and fishing vessels. The still-pending cases involving the detained vessels “Sky Moon” and “Nord” demonstrate that, if they so desire, the Russians can quite easily derail a case—all it takes is finding the right approach to judges and law enforcement officials.

Third, there are criminal proceedings against individuals for collaborating with the Russian Federation’s occupation authorities in Crimea and the East, as well as other high-profile cases related to the conflict. There is also widespread abuse of pretrial measures here (since a significant number of judges view crimes under Articles 110 and 111 of the Criminal Code as minor offenses—provided, of course, that treason or an encroachment on territorial integrity was committed in favor of the Russian Federation). Separately, it is worth noting the situation in such high-profile cases for the Russian Federation as the “Yanukovych case” and the “May 2 case.”

And fourth, it is important to highlight the proceedings initiated by individuals under the control of the Russian Federation regarding the alleged illegality of trade restrictions with Crimea and restrictions on the supply of water and electricity to Crimea, with the ultimate aim of “reaching out” to global and European human rights organizations.

A separate area of the Russians’ legal work in Ukraine has been lobbying, through civil society organizations, members of parliament, and other officials, for a number of legal provisions. First and foremost, this involves the adoption of legislation that minimizes the extent and practical consequences of liability for collaborators in Crimea and the East. It is also important for the Russians to secure the adoption of legislation that effectively legalizes documents issued by Russian authorities in Crimea and the East. Naturally, the Russians are interested in maintaining Ukraine’s current legislation—which legalizes economic activity in the temporarily occupied Crimea—as well as in ensuring Ukraine’s continued non-participation in the Rome Statute and the failure to make corresponding amendments to Ukraine’s criminal legislation.

The Russians are paying particular attention to maintaining the position that Ukraine’s continued participation in the 2003 Agreement on Cooperation in the Use of the Azov Sea and the Kerch Strait in the 1993 Agreement on Fisheries in the Azov Sea, and the alleged validity of these documents. And, of course, the Russians are doing everything in their power to undermine the quality of the materials prepared by the authorized bodies for interstate cases before the International Court of Justice, the International Criminal Court, and the European Court of Human Rights—cases initiated by Ukraine in response to Russian aggression.

Among the specific legal measures that the Russian Federation employs within its own jurisdiction, special mention should be made of the systematic establishment of its own unlawful regulatory system in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol. However, within the framework of this extremely broad phenomenon, a number of measures of particular importance to the enemy should be highlighted. First, there is the gradual elimination of all Ukrainian organizational and administrative acts that serve as the basis for the exercise of human rights (to citizenship, to residence in Crimea, to land and other real estate, etc.), followed by the violation of such rights.

Second, it involves the mass recruitment of Ukrainian citizens—beyond the officials of the occupying authorities themselves—in violation of the regime of the occupied territory (“election commissions,” “draft boards,” “juries”). Other key legal measures taken by the occupiers include the ban on representative bodies of the Crimean Tatar people; the application in Crimea of Russian Federation legislation that significantly restricts political human rights and establishes liability for “extremism”; the regulatory pretense of respecting the rights of Crimea’s ethnic groups for foreign policy purposes; and the retroactive application of Russian Federation regulations to events in Crimea from 1991 to 2014.

A separate area of focus has been the Russian Federation’s preparation of “legal” grounds for claiming the maximum extent of maritime areas around Crimea as allegedly belonging to Russia. This manifested itself in the Russians’ regulatory establishment of “nature reserve boundaries” at sea, “boundaries of the maritime search and rescue zone,” as well as in the documentation of actions by Russian forces at “Chornomornaftogaz” facilities and against Ukrainian fishermen in maritime waters.

Nor should we forget the Russian Federation’s law enforcement agencies’ application of “universal jurisdiction” against Ukrainian military personnel and other officials for their alleged commission of “international crimes” on the territory of Ukraine, nor should we overlook the adoption, within the Russian Federation’s legal system, of a series of acts aimed at “legalizing” the existence of the Russian Federation’s occupation authorities in eastern Ukraine as “state entities” (recognition of “passports,” “diplomas,” etc.). Another clear legal manifestation of aggression was the adoption of Russian Federation regulations granting Russian citizenship to a significant portion of the residents of eastern and southern Ukraine.

In the jurisdictions of third countries, the Russian Federation also seeks to carry out legal activities against Ukraine both through legitimate means (legal, diplomatic, and consular activities) and through corruption risks and the use of pro-Russian officials.

First and foremost, this involves establishing organizational, legal, and case-law practices that de facto recognize the attempted annexation of Crimea, by facilitating the conclusion of contracts with Crimean entities controlled by the Russian Federation, re-registering the property of third-country residents under Russian law, and securing rulings by national courts (such as the “Scythian gold” case, etc.).

The Russians are also actively engaged in establishing organizational, legal, and case law practices that do not classify the conflict in the East as Russian aggression and confirm that Ukrainian officials and military personnel have committed “international crimes,” and to counter the issuance of fair rulings by courts in third countries in such cases (the “Markov case,” the “M14 case,” etc.). Nor should we forget the Russian Federation’s active opposition to the rendering, entry into force, and enforcement of international arbitration awards initiated by property owners in Crimea under the Ukraine-Russia Agreement on the Protection of Investments in the respective national jurisdictions.

Among the Russian Federation’s interesting and “creative” legal measures abroad have been the staging of fake “public international tribunals” regarding high-profile events of the conflict (the “Boeing tribunal,” the “Kerch provocation tribunal”). Similarly, the Russians are actively attempting, within the framework of international police and legal cooperation—in particular through Interpol—to have cases initiated by the Russian Federation against Ukrainian activists and military personnel prosecuted in third countries.

In the context of international jurisdiction, the Russian Federation focuses primarily on cases brought by Ukraine and Ukrainian residents against the Russian Federation before the UN International Court of Justice, the International Criminal Court, and the European Court of Human Rights, as well as UN committees and arbitration tribunals on the law of the sea and investment protection. However, this relatively legal activity by the Russian Federation is accompanied, in particular, by the mass fabrication—through front “human rights organizations”—of complaints against Ukraine filed by individuals and legal entities with the ECHR in connection with events in Crimea and the east.

Furthermore, the Russian Federation’s current self-imposed restrictions on its participation in international humanitarian law mechanisms do not formally violate international law. These include the Russian Federation’s withdrawal of its signature from the Rome Statute and its cessation of recognition of the powers of the Fact-Finding Commission under the Geneva Conventions. However, the purpose of these actions is clear: to prevent Russian officials from being prosecuted for international crimes, both war crimes and crimes against humanity.

Another factor is the Russian Federation’s abuse of the norms of international maritime law to consolidate its dominance in the Black and Azov Seas. The Russians also manipulate and misapply the provisions of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, the Montreux Convention, the Black Sea PSC Memorandum, as well as the aforementioned “Azov agreements” of 1993 and 2003. The Russians also systematically abuse institutions established by maritime law, such as innocent passage, platform safety zones, pipeline protection, and notifications to mariners regarding restricted areas, among others.

A characteristic feature of the Russian Federation’s legal strategy has been the abuse of the regulations of international organizations to ensure the participation of collaborators from Crimea as members of Russian delegations, and to conduct mass presentations of false positions regarding events in Ukraine by “civil society and human rights organizations” controlled by the Russian Federation “civil society and human rights organizations,” as well as holding fabricated conferences and presentations on “Russian Crimea.”

The absence of a coordinated legal policy to counter Russian aggression under such conditions will inevitably lead to irreparable and far-reaching negative legal consequences.