The most characteristic tactic of Russia’s maritime policy in most areas is the effort to shift relations with weaker neighbors into frameworks that are not bound by global standards.

The Russian Federation’s maritime policy draws on several centuries of experience in advancing the interests of a global continental power in maritime spaces. Today, Moscow combines all possible instruments and means of economic, legal, scientific, technical, and military influence in its maritime policy, demonstrating exceptional tactical flexibility, and the restrictions imposed on Russian ambitions by the system of maritime law are viewed by the Kremlin as temporary and subject to change, thereby creating a new reality.

Respect, but disregard

Official Russian documents declare its recognition of the primacy of international law, including both the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and other instruments. Russia actively participates in all global treaty-based mechanisms for regulating commercial shipping and in the activities of the International Maritime Organization. The Russian Federation’s maritime legislation, unlike that of post-Soviet Ukraine, is of fairly high quality and generally complies with international standards. The Russian Federation has adopted a number of strategic maritime policy documents, such as the Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation through 2020 and the Fundamentals of the Russian Federation’s State Policy in the Field of Naval Activities through 2030.

 Meanwhile, Russia currently regards military force and the technical modernization of its merchant and specialized fleets, as well as the development of relevant infrastructure and management mechanisms, as the key instruments for implementing its maritime policy. Russia pursues its own interests both through strictly legitimate means (negotiations, bilateral agreements, and rulings by international organizations and courts favorable to Russia) and through the use of leverage (bribing international officials, exerting economic and security pressure on neighbors), as well as through the direct use of military force at sea (against Ukraine, Georgia, and Syria) and armed provocations.

 At the same time, Russia cannot claim the status of a global maritime power, due to the Russian Navy’s lag behind the world’s leading nations in a number of indicators (with the exception of nuclear submarines), as well as the relatively limited significance of its research, merchant, and fishing fleets. Under these circumstances, Russia’s maritime interest zones are divided into regional clusters where it can dominate (the Caspian and Black Seas) or compete (the Arctic, Far East, and Baltic Seas) with other maritime powers. The most characteristic tactic of Russia’s maritime policy in most of these areas is to fuel instability and provoke conflicts, as well as to seek to shift relations with weaker neighbors into special frameworks not bound by global standards of maritime law.

 Its Own Waters

In the Arctic region, the Russian Federation is pursuing two strategic goals: to consolidate Russian sovereignty over the Northern Sea Route (NSR) and to expand the Russian Federation’s zone of sovereignty over the Arctic continental shelf. Russia’s Arctic policy is being implemented in a region where the Russian Federation effectively has a monopoly on presence, creating favorable conditions for cementing the de facto status quo until it becomes part of the legal order. The Russian Federation has unilaterally, relying on certain provisions of UNCLOS, introduced a permit system for foreign-flagged merchant ships transiting the NSR.

The unique nature of this region makes Russian maritime transport a monopoly in carrying out commercially attractive operations. After all, the Russian state currently holds a monopoly on icebreaker services, particularly nuclear-powered ones, whose fleet Russia has been radically modernizing and expanding in recent years. On the other hand, the Russian Federation adheres (unlike, for example, Ukraine) to the principle of a strict monopoly on the use of inland waterways by vessels registered exclusively in Russia, and the use of the Arctic maritime route without navigating Russian polar rivers has limited commercial value. A similar monopoly significantly affects the development of maritime use in the Caspian Sea, which is connected to the ocean precisely through Russian inland waterways.

The Russian Federation has not yet succeeded in attracting sufficient foreign investment for the development of oil and gas production on the Arctic shelf. At the same time, Moscow considers the development of this sector to be promising. Arctic fishing for the Russian Federation is regional in nature and is significant primarily in the Barents Sea.

Overall, in the Arctic, the Russian economy and population depend more on the sea than they are focused on its effective development. Russia has made certain concessions to Norway and the United States regarding the delimitation of the waters of the Bering Strait, the Bering Sea, and the Barents Sea, while simultaneously submitting applications to the UN Commission to establish the maximum possible control over the continental shelf and waters of the Central Arctic. In general, the world has taken a fairly neutral stance toward these Russian intentions, with the exception of the position of other Arctic nations. The only issue concerning the Russian Arctic that could be brought up in global discussions is marine pollution—particularly nuclear pollution—caused by its militarization.

Russia’s maritime policy in the Far East shares certain characteristics with that of the Arctic, as the region remains crucial both for the deployment of the Russian Navy and for the prospect of exploiting offshore resources. The differences lie in the openness of the region’s ports and waters to foreign commercial shipping, the importance of marine fisheries to the economy and population of these territories, and the existence of a territorial dispute between Russia and Japan over the Kuril Islands. Among the Russian Federation’s major achievements in this region is the 2014 decision by the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf regarding Russia’s rights to the central part of the Okhotsk Sea shelf. Russia also seeks recognition of Peter the Great Gulf—where Vladivostok and key Russian port and military facilities are located—as its historical waters.

As in the Arctic, maritime routes here remain strategically important for supporting the economy and population of the Russian islands, Kamchatka, and Chukotka. At the same time, Russia’s maritime routes in the East are more vulnerable due to their openness and the highly competitive environment.

A distinctive feature of bilateral Japanese-Russian relations regarding maritime policy in the area of the disputed islands is Japan’s de facto compliance with the norms and rules established in accordance with Russian sovereignty over the islands and the surrounding maritime space. At the same time, a unique type of economic relationship has developed between the two countries in this maritime region, driven by the acute dependence of the island populations on both sides on the harvesting of marine biological resources. It is important to note that the Russian Federation currently supports its position regarding the Kuril Islands with a series of Soviet-Japanese and Russian-Japanese agreements on fisheries, in which the Japanese side was at the time forced to recognize, either directly or indirectly, the Russian Federation’s control over the islands and adjacent waters. There is an obvious parallel with the Russian Federation’s similar practice of gradually consolidating its rights to the Sea of Azov through the conclusion of unequal protocols with Ukraine.

The Factor of Dominance

Just like the waters of the Barents Sea, the waters of the Baltic Sea are the site of tense interstate relations involving the Russian Federation and NATO member states. Formally, the Russian Federation has no unresolved territorial issues in the Baltic Sea, except for the unratified agreement with Estonia on the delimitation of the Narva and Finnish Gulfs. Despite the unfavorable conditions of the Baltic Sea for Russian maritime policy, the Russian Federation is currently successfully implementing a number of objectives there. This includes modernizing its naval force with relatively small vessels, as well as the development of a network of ports and shipbuilding in Greater St. Petersburg, the laying of pipelines (“Nord Stream”) to Germany, and the exerting of negative influence on the maritime policies of the Baltic states and Poland. For example, long before the Azov crisis, the Russian Federation successfully blocked Poland’s access to the Vistula Lagoon, the entrance to which is controlled by the Russian Federation in the Kaliningrad Oblast. This led to the decline of the port of Elbląg, a problem that remains unresolved to this day.

It is worth recalling that since the early 2000s, has periodically and arbitrarily tightened requirements for vessels traveling to and from the Polish ports of Elbląg and Frombork in the Vistula Lagoon through the only passage to the Baltic Sea—the Baltic Strait—which is entirely under Russian control. Currently, Poland is forced to dig a navigable channel through the Vistula Spit, which will connect the bay and the sea on Polish territory; The most interesting aspect here is that Russia is attempting to stall this construction by filing complaints with the European Commission over “environmental risks” and by wielding its own influence in Brussels. It is clear that both Poland and Russia recognize the strategic importance of this canal.

The Baltic Sea is important for Russia’s fishing industry and for ensuring trade with other coastal states, particularly Germany. The military significance of the Baltic Sea remains secondary and is primarily focused on diversionary and reconnaissance operations in the standoff between Russia and NATO.

In the Caspian Sea, Russia successfully exploits disputes between Iran and other littoral states over the distribution of fisheries and energy resources, while also developing distinct bilateral relationships with each of them. However, even under these circumstances, in 2018 the states of the basin adopted the Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea. This has undoubtedly reduced the level of uncertainty and conflict potential in the region, and was most likely the result of Russia’s efforts to protect itself from an escalation of tensions in the region that would currently be disadvantageous to it.

As a compromise, the convention benefits all Caspian countries, but first and foremost Iran, which has finally abolished the colonial terms of the 1920 agreement with Soviet Russia. Since maritime transit from the Caspian Sea to the world’s oceans passes not only through the Russian Federation’s Black Sea Fleet but also through the Kerch Strait, this situation will have strategic implications for Ukraine as well. After all, Russia maintains a strong position in the tanker fleet sector, which, under the Russian flag, has unique capabilities for transporting Caspian energy resources to countries along the Danube, the Black Sea, and the Mediterranean Sea.

Following the collapse of the USSR, Russia made significant efforts to consolidate its positions in the waters of the Black Sea, the Kerch Strait, and the Danube. In particular, Russia retained the USSR’s membership in the Danube Commission and its de facto status as a Danube state, which helps it both to conduct “river-to-sea” shipping between the Caspian Sea and Central Europe, as well as to maintain direct cargo traffic—including military shipments—with Serbia via the Danube. Even before 2014, through treaties signed in 1993 and 2003, the Russian Federation secured from Ukraine not only military bases in Crimea but also consent to what amounted to joint use of the Sea of Azov and the Kerch Strait.

Currently, the Black Sea is used by Russia as the main trade route with Turkey and the Mediterranean countries. This basin is also important for Russia’s Caspian and Danube shipping, and its main distinction from other Russian waters lies in the weakness of maritime governance in neighboring states and the existence of vast “gray zones” surrounding the occupied territories of Crimea and Abkhazia. This has turned the basin into a vast arena for industrial-scale maritime smuggling between Russia, the countries of the Middle East, and Europe.

Hydrocarbon production on the Black Sea shelf is limited in scope and is primarily aimed at ensuring energy security for the annexed Crimea. Russia views the Azov-Black Sea region as a springboard for the further annexation of Ukraine and Georgia, as well as for direct military, intelligence, and sabotage operations against Romania and Bulgaria. The Russian Federation also uses this maritime area to support its own military, sabotage, diplomatic, and economic activities in the Mediterranean Sea, the Red Sea, and the Indian Ocean. The unique situation of the Russian Navy’s dominance in these waters makes it possible for Russia to achieve its maritime policy goal in this region: to completely transform it into a sphere of Russian dominance.

Occupation Policy

The de facto control over the Sea of Azov, which Russia acquired as a result of the occupation of the Crimean Peninsula and the construction of the Kerch Bridge and which is maintained by a treaty-basedlegal regime with Ukraine—provides Russia with virtually unlimited opportunities for a presence in the Azov Sea and for the use of its biological resources. Taking advantage of its military superiority and de facto control of the Kerch Strait, Russia has blocked the Sea of Azov to Ukrainian military vessels and is restricting commercial shipping to the ports of Berdiansk and Mariupol. Russia’s actions in the Sea of Azov indicate that Moscow is implementing a strategy of gradual maritime economic isolation of Ukraine in the Azov-Black Sea basin.

Given the restrictions on third-country access to the Sea of Azov under the 2003 Treaty, the threats of isolation for Ukraine’s Azov coast are significantly increasing. To achieve this goal, the Russian Federation employs both administrative and procedural methods (control, inspections, and the creation of artificial pretexts for prolonged vessel delays) as well as military ones (closing certain sections of the Azov Sea under the pretext of conducting naval exercises). Russia’s obstruction of economic activity in Ukraine’s Azov region—including port operations and fishing—is aimed at destroying the region’s economy and further destabilizing it politically.

Russia actively exploits existing treaties and agreements with Ukraine—including both the 2003 Treaty and the annual Protocols on fisheries in the Sea of Azov—to strengthen its political position in its confrontation with Ukraine. Kyiv currently has no guarantees that Moscow will abide by the agreements within the existing legal framework and is limited in its ability to protect its interests and assert its rights in the waters of the Sea of Azov and the Kerch Strait.

Russia’s only competitor for influence in the Black Sea may be Turkey, whose naval power (concentrated in the Mediterranean) still surpasses Russia’s in certain respects, and which controls the passage regime through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. Ankara’s acquiescence toward Russia in interpreting the provisions of the 1936 Montreux Convention regarding the use of the Black Sea straits warrants particular attention.

Control over Crimea and the deployment of military equipment on the production and drilling platforms of the Ukrainian state-owned company “Chornomornaftogaz” have given the Russian Black Sea Fleet the ability to exercise full control over the northern part of the Black Sea. The main threat to Ukraine in the Black Sea today is Russia’s aggressive intentions and actions aimed at further destabilizing Ukraine’s southern regions, the initial stage of which could be the establishment of Russian control over Zmiinyi Island and the remaining parts of the economic zone adjacent to mainland Ukraine, followed by control over shipping to Ukraine’s Black Sea ports and the mouth of the Danube.

The Russian Federation’s influence on Ukraine’s maritime sector is absolutely unique, even in the context of an interstate conflict.

It is evident that Russia continues to exert a significant and enduring influence on the maritime education system, fisheries management, and the port sector. One example, prior to 2015, was the shipyard that supplied vessels to the Ukrainian Navy (“Leninska Kuznya,” later “Kuznya na Rybals’komu”), and the country’s leading maritime educational institution (the Odesa National Maritime Academy) were under the official supervision of the Russian Maritime Register of Shipping for many years. To this day, the State Agency for Fisheries of Ukraine signs joint protocols with Russia every year to allocate fishing quotas in the Sea of Azov. Furthermore, domestic media have repeatedly reported on the Russian ties of the head of the “Administration of Seaports of Ukraine,” Mr. R. Vetskagans, particularly in the sphere of intelligence services. Ukraine’s sovereign maritime policy could remedy the situation, provided there is the political will within the ruling circles to develop and implement it.