Temporary Protection in the EU and Reserve+: What Has Changed

Over the past week, a number of people have contacted me with questions about temporary protection in the EU, which—despite differing circumstances—all boil down to the same thing.

In the Czech Republic, Ukrainians have begun to be denied temporary protection. In Spain, according to those who have applied there, officials are requiring an extract from the Reserve+ app—and in some cases, even from women. Given these reports, it seems that European policy toward displaced persons from Ukraine has undergone a silent revision.

No such revision has taken place. All the situations mentioned, despite the geographical distance between them, stem from a single document, the content of which is largely relayed through secondhand accounts.

What Exactly Did the Council of the EU Adopt?

On July 30, 2026, the Council of the EU adopted Implementing Decision 2026/1912, and its main point should be stated right away: the temporary protection mechanism for displaced persons from Ukraine has been extended for another year, until March 4, 2028. As of the end of May, 4.38 million people were benefiting from this regime, and the decision does not provide for any phase-out or gradual termination.

Another provision sparked debate: for the first time in the four years the mechanism has been in place, a condition has been added to the text that was not there before—temporary protection is granted only to those who are performing their military duties in Ukraine and, if necessary, are able to confirm this.

This wording deserves special attention. It mentions neither gender nor age nor any age limits—instead, it uses a broader formulation that covers individuals upon whom military duties are imposed under Ukrainian law. Defining the scope of such individuals falls under national—that is, Ukrainian—law, and it is precisely this delegation that has been the source of most subsequent complications.

An Error in the Dates and Why You Should Be Aware of It

Before moving on to the substance of the provision, it is necessary to explain a circumstance that could cast doubt on the accuracy of the dates listed below.

The decision was adopted on July 30 and published on August 4; however, the text stated that the new provision applies as of July 31 and does not apply to individuals who were covered as of July 30. Thus, the rule formally took effect four days before its official publication.

On August 5, the Council published an official correction, replacing “July 30” with “August 4” in Article 2 and “July 31” with “August 5” in Article 3. After that, the structure became logically complete: the decision took effect the day after its publication, and the new provision applies from that same date.

The complication lies in the fact that the correction was published as a separate document and has not been incorporated into the main text on the official EU portal. That is why the Polish immigration authority, in its August 6 announcement—as well as the Ukrainian Embassy in Spain—continues to refer to July 31: they are not making a mistake but are faithfully reproducing the published text. From now on, these two documents should be read together.

Who Is Exempt from the New EU Requirement

The most important point for most readers is that the new condition does not apply to individuals who, as of August 4, 2026, were already receiving temporary protection in a specific Member State and have been continuously receiving it there.

Therefore, if a person has been residing in Poland or the Czech Republic for three years with valid status, this decision alone does not constitute grounds to require them to provide an extract from Rezerv+, confirmation of a deferral, or proof of the legality of their departure. The Czech Ministry of the Interior, in particular, has explicitly stated that this new condition is not verified during the renewal of protection.

In light of this, widespread headlines such as “The Czech Republic is revoking protection for Ukrainians” do not hold up to scrutiny. The Czech Republic is denying protection to new applicants, which is a fundamentally different situation from a legal standpoint, although news reports regularly conflate the two.

The new condition applies to three categories: first-time applicants; those who previously had protection but lost it or voluntarily renounced it and are reapplying; and, least obviously, those seeking protection for the purpose of family reunification.

The latter category deserves special attention, as it is precisely this group that appears to involve the most complex cases. The situation is as follows: a woman with children has been living in the Czech Republic for three years, has legal status and a job, and her child attends school; and her husband, having obtained a legal basis for departure, joins the family—and to the Czech authorities, he is a new applicant subject to the full vetting procedure.

What role does Reserve+ play in the decision?

Now to the question that interests most people: Did the EU Council really require all applicants to submit an extract from Reserve+? The decision does not contain such a requirement.

The burden of proof is structured as follows. The first step is to determine whether the person left Ukraine legally—by legally crossing the border or through a stamp in their passport—and this is based on a simple premise: if the Ukrainian state allowed a person to cross the border, there were grounds for doing so at that time. Such grounds could vary—medical unfitness, deferment, reservation, family circumstances, disability, permanent residence abroad, — and a foreign official does not need to delve into the intricacies of Ukrainian military law to verify the very fact of a lawful departure.

In practice, this presents a complication, as not everyone has a border-crossing stamp: a passport may have been replaced, or the previous document may have been lost. In such cases, other official confirmations may be used, including information from the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine.

And only when it is impossible to establish the legality of departure is the second level applied—an official document in paper or electronic form confirming exemption from military service or its completion. It is precisely at this point in the text that “Reserve+” is mentioned—as an example of one possible source, not as the sole or mandatory document.

The burden of proof must also be taken into account, as in this case it rests specifically with the applicant. It is not the state’s responsibility to determine whether a person is evading their duties—rather, the person must confirm that they are fulfilling them.

One Provision and Five Different Interpretations

The next stage is of greatest interest, as this is where the common European rule breaks down into national practices, the differences between which have proven to be significant. I’ll state my conclusion right away: the main problem lies not in the EU Council’s decision itself, but in the fact that its application has diverged so widely among member states that the applicant is objectively unable to predict the scope of the requirements imposed on them.

The Czech Republic has gone the furthest, publishing a detailed algorithm in which the electronic military registration document is present in all envisaged scenarios; an exit stamp also appears in it, but not on its own—only in conjunction with the eVOD. A screenshot is not accepted; a paper copy is required, and when submitting the application, the official additionally asks the applicant to demonstrate their active profile in the app. This requirement applies to men and women aged 18 to 60 who are subject to military service, with different requirements for the 18–22 and 23–60 age groups.

A telling comment comes from Veronika Votočková, a representative of the Czech Ministry of the Interior: according to her, an exit stamp can also confirm fulfillment of military service obligations, but preference is given to an extract from “Reserve+” as a more reliable source. In the EU Council’s decision, the order is reversed—first, the legality of departure, and only if this cannot be confirmed, a military registration document—so the Czech approach shifts the emphasis specifically to the document. The consequences were predictable: several dozen denials in less than a week after the decision took effect.

This shift is clearly evident in the case of the youngest applicants. Men aged 18–22 can leave Ukraine freely, since following the change in border crossing rules in August 2025, the general restriction does not apply to them; consequently, they pass the first level of verification without difficulty. Despite this, the Czech procedure requires them to confirm their registration in “Reserve+” and submit a paper military registration document, whereas those in the 23–60 age group are expected to provide a document certifying their exemption from military service.

Here, however, it is appropriate to make a caveat, without which the entire argument would be misunderstood. The legality of departure and the fulfillment of military service are concepts that do not always coincide. The fact that a 19-year-old citizen was allowed to cross the border merely confirms the absence of an age restriction on departure, but in no way confirms that he is registered for military service, even though that obligation has been imposed on him. Therefore, the Czech requirement cannot be considered unfounded: it is directed precisely at the obligation that actually exists under Ukrainian law. The problem runs deeper and concerns the EU Council’s decision itself, which left a gap between the condition—namely, the fulfillment of military service—and the first level of proof required—namely, the legality of departure, from which the fulfillment of that obligation does not necessarily follow in every case. Each state bridges this gap at its own discretion, and this is precisely where the divergence in practices stems from.

Latvia has taken the opposite approach, publishing a list that literally follows the decision’s formula: a departure stamp or an official document in paper or digital form, such as an extract from “Reserve+.” This is provided merely as an example, not as a mandatory requirement. At the same time, the Latvian side added its own rule: if a deferral is in place, protection is granted only until the date of its expiration.

Ireland reworded the condition without any mention of specific applications, reducing it to a single question: whether the person had the right under Ukrainian law to leave the territory of Ukraine.

Poland applies the decision but has not yet published its own list of required documents; therefore, it is premature to claim that the requirements there are less stringent: the procedure simply has not yet been described.

The situation in Spain remains the least clear. Ukrainians who have applied there report being required to submit military registration documents, specifically from “Reserve+,” and in some cases, this applies to women as well. There have been so many such inquiries that the Ukrainian Embassy in Spain has officially requested clarification from the Spanish side regarding the procedure for implementing the new decision and the scope of requirements that the competent authorities are authorized to impose. As of the time of this writing, no response has been received.

Why Are Women Facing These Issues?

Here, we must acknowledge a fact that many will find unacceptable: verifying the military registration status of a Ukrainian woman is not, in and of itself, an arbitrary act simply because she is a woman.

Ukrainian law does indeed impose military obligations on certain categories of women. The most obvious example is women with medical or pharmaceutical specializations who are fit for service based on their health and age and are subject to military registration; there are also cases of voluntary registration and service under contract. The EU Council’s decision explicitly addressed this circumstance, noting that military obligations may exist regardless of age or gender.

Therefore, the mere fact of the verification is not absurd. The complication arises in the next step.

Suppose a Ukrainian woman with no medical training—who has never been subject to military service and was not required to be registered—approaches a migration authority, and an official, acting in accordance with internal guidelines, demands that she provide an extract from “Reserve+.” This raises a question to which no instruction provides an answer: how can one confirm the fulfillment of an obligation that the law never imposed on that person?

Such a person cannot submit a document confirming exemption from service, since there was nothing from which to exempt her. She is forced to prove the absence of a fact, whereas the EU Council’s decision does not establish any procedure by which such absence should be proven.

It is precisely here, in my view, that the bulk of disputes will arise in the near future—not regarding the state’s right to verify, but regarding whether each case is assessed individually or whether the same document is required of everyone without distinction.

Protection in Only One EU Member State

There is one more circumstance that has received very little attention, despite its practical significance.

The same decision establishes the principle that temporary protection may be granted in only one Member State: if it is evident that a person has already been granted a residence permit under this regime in another country, the new application must be rejected. This approach is based on the position of the Court of Justice of the European Union, as stated in February 2025, and Ireland is already applying it directly by denying protection to those who have received it in another EU member state.

There is only one practical conclusion to be drawn from this, and for many, it comes as a surprise: the approach whereby a person renounces their status in one country in order to apply in another with better conditions no longer works. Moreover, it has become risky, since any subsequent application will be processed under the new rules and with the status of a new applicant.

Practical Recommendations

First. Do not rely on a single document; gather all evidence confirming the date and legality of your border crossing.

Second: If you are subject to military service, ensure you have a valid military registration document, as in a number of countries, the processing of your application will be complicated without it.

Third. If you have a specific legal basis—such as deferment, reservation, ineligibility, or removal from the military registry—submit documents whose content clearly establishes this basis without the need for additional correspondence with Ukrainian authorities: a foreign official will not send inquiries to the territorial recruitment center.

Fourth. Check the requirements of the specific country to which you are submitting your application, since, as seen in the examples of the Czech Republic and Latvia, the differences are not merely cosmetic.

In the event of a denial, request a written decision stating the grounds for the denial and a written list of the evidence the authority considers acceptable. Without these documents, an appeal lacks a basis.

Conclusions

The EU Council’s decision itself gives no cause for alarm; Europe has not closed its doors, protection remains in place, and millions of people continue to benefit from it.

However, between the regulation adopted in Brussels and the official accepting documents in Prague, Madrid, or Riga lies a significant layer of national legislation, internal instructions, and established practices. It is already evident today just how differently the same provision can be interpreted.

Therefore, the most crucial part of this story is yet to come, and it will unfold not in the Council of the EU, but in the administrative courts of European countries—through lawsuits filed by specific individuals who were required to provide a document they could not possibly have.