Emergency Entry into a Residence: An Analysis of Bill No. 15488

On August 7, 2026, Bill No. 15488 (hereinafter referred to as the “Bill”) was registered with the Verkhovna Rada to amend Article 233 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine (hereinafter referred to as the “CPC”). The Bill aims to close a long-standing loophole, namely the vagueness of the concept of “rescuing property” as grounds for entering a residence without a warrant from an investigating judge. The problem is real and well-known, so the question is whether the proposed text resolves it or creates new ones.

Shortcomings of the Current Regulation

Pursuant to Article 30 of the Constitution of Ukraine (hereinafter—the Constitution), in urgent cases involving the rescue of human life and property or the immediate pursuit of a suspect, a different procedure for entering a dwelling, as established by law, is permitted, and the provision explicitly mentions not only entry but also “conducting an inspection and search therein.” This exception is reflected in Part 3 of Article 233 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which, however, does not explain what “saving property” means.

The practical implication is clear, since almost any need to find evidence can be described as a risk of its loss. Documents could theoretically be burned, and money could be withdrawn. If this logic is accepted without restrictions, the distinction between an urgent and a scheduled search disappears, and prior judicial oversight becomes optional.

Practical Application

There are no publicly available consolidated official data on the number of urgent searches specifically, and this is already part of the problem, since the scale of the phenomenon cannot be independently verified. One can only form an impression based on court decisions.

National practice has not been consistent. A ruling by the Cassation Criminal Court within the Supreme Court (hereinafter “CCC SC”) dated April 8, 2021, in case No. 573/2028/19, it was stated that the recovery of stolen property does not constitute grounds for an urgent search. These discrepancies were resolved by a ruling of the Joint Chamber of the CSC of the SC dated October 7, 2024, in case No. 466/525/22, according to which the recovery of items that could potentially serve as physical evidence, from anticipated destruction falls under the concept of “rescue of property,” however, the motion and the investigating judge’s ruling must specify the concrete circumstances of the actual threat, and the court hearing the case on its merits is required to assess the urgency independently.

On July 10, 2025, the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter “ECHR”) issued a judgment in the case of Korniyets and Others v. Ukraine (applications Nos. 2599/16, 6904/16, 12704/16) (hereinafter “the Judgment”), in which it found a violation of Article 8 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms with respect to four applicants whose homes were searched in 2015 without a prior order from an investigating judge. The ECHR noted that ex post facto legalization did not provide sufficient safeguards, as the applicants did not participate in the proceedings, the orders were not subject to appeal, and the judges merely reproduced the standard wording of the investigating judge’s motions. Oleksandr Korniets was awarded 5,000 euros in compensation for non-pecuniary damage and 1,000 euros in legal costs; the Yashyshen couple were each awarded 5,000 euros; and Tetiana Zhabo was awarded 500 euros in compensation for material damages.

Content of the Proposed Amendments

The bill amends Part 3 of Article 233 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by adding conditions that must be met simultaneously in order to enter a residence for the purpose of saving property:

• a reasoned decision by an investigator, inquiry officer, or prosecutor, adopted pursuant to Article 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure;
• specific, individually identified property;
• evidence gathered during criminal proceedings providing reasonable grounds to believe that such property constitutes material evidence;
• a real, specific, and immediate threat of destruction, damage, or loss of the property;
• an objective impossibility of obtaining a ruling from an investigating judge without the risk of losing the property.

The bill also introduces a requirement to apply to an investigating judge within 24 hours of the completion of the relevant actions and the investigating judge’s obligation to verify the existence of grounds. If such grounds are absent, a separate ruling is issued declaring the search unlawful with respect to all persons who made the decision; and in the event that the prosecutor refuses to approve the motion or the court denies it, the evidence is deemed inadmissible, and the seized property and documents must be returned within 24 hours.

5. Strengths of the Draft Law

The main advantage lies in the codification of the criteria that the Supreme Court has already established. When an investigator makes a decision at 3:00 a.m., they rely on the text of the law rather than on the body of rulings by the Judicial Chamber of the Supreme Court; therefore, transferring the standard from the reasoning section to the statutory provision reduces the scope for interpretation.

The requirement for a written, reasoned ruling creates a document that can be evaluated later. The requirement to return seized items should prevent situations where equipment and funds remain in the possession of the pretrial investigation authority even after its actions have been deemed unlawful.

Finally, the Decision explicitly pointed out the flaws in the Ukrainian model of post-facto oversight, so the legislature will have to respond in any case.

6. Shortcomings to Be Addressed Before the Second Reading

The condition that “sufficient evidence has been gathered in the criminal proceedings” sets a higher standard for the exception than Article 235 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides for a regular search (“sufficient grounds to believe”). The urgency stems from a lack of time, not a lack of evidence; therefore, if interpreted literally, this provision will rarely apply. At the same time, for review by an investigating judge, the bill sets a lower standard, namely evidence that “would directly or indirectly indicate” the possible presence of items. Two different standards within a single provision will inevitably lead to inconsistent practice.

Furthermore, the aforementioned condition regarding the sufficiency of evidence cannot be met until the information is entered into the Unified Register of Pretrial Investigations; therefore, an inspection of the crime scene under Part 3 of Article 214 of the Code of Criminal Procedure remains outside the scope of the new restrictions.

The bill also fails to clarify the distinction between “entry” and a search involving seizure, as well as the requirement to obtain the owner’s “voluntary consent.”

By linking the salvage of property exclusively to physical evidence, the draft law effectively excludes entry for the purpose of salvaging property in the literal sense—namely, from fire, flooding, or theft—even though this is precisely the wording contained in Article 30 of the Constitution. At the same time, the equation “property = physical evidence”—which critics have opposed—is included in the text of the Code of Criminal Procedure for the first time.

The current version of Article 233(3) of the CPC requires that an application be made to the investigating judge “without delay,” whereas the draft bill replaces this wording with “within 24 hours of the completion of such actions.” Formally, this is a clarification; in practice, however, it sets a ceiling below which no one will go—and moreover, the investigator himself determines the moment of completion. This is more of a weakening than a strengthening of safeguards.

The current CPC does not recognize a type of decision by an investigating judge known as a “separate ruling,” and the resolution of the Qualification and Disciplinary Commission of the Supreme Court dated June 14, 2021, in Case No. 686/9636/18, explicitly states that the CPC does not regulate the issuance of separate rulings. The draft law defines neither the content, nor the consequences, nor the procedure for appealing such a ruling, and the list of rulings that may be appealed (Article 309 of the CPC) is not expanded. The public determination of the elements of an offense under Article 162 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine with respect to named individuals, without the possibility of review, is a vulnerability.

The 24-hour deadline for the return of property conflicts with Part 5 of Article 171 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which allows 48 hours to file a motion for the seizure of confiscated property, and does not provide for exceptions for items removed from civil circulation. This time limit is also inconsistent with the procedure for lifting an arrest that has already been imposed.

Article 255 of the CPC, to which the Draft Law refers, governs the destruction of information obtained during covert investigative (search) operations and does not apply to searches. The draft law replicates a long-standing error in the current version and further adds a requirement to return those very same documents.

Conclusions

The problem addressed by the draft law is real, as the vagueness of the “property preservation” grounds, the formal nature of post-facto oversight, and the defeat in Strasbourg are facts, not mere rhetoric. The approach of incorporating the Supreme Court’s criteria from judicial practice into the text of the law appears justified.

It is telling that the ECHR, in its Judgment, did not dispute the very possibility of a search without a warrant, but rather found a violation specifically due to the superficial nature of the subsequent review. The draft law, however, shifts the primary emphasis to substantive grounds, while making only minimal changes to the review mechanism.

Furthermore, the specific wording of the draft law has a number of flaws, several of which could produce the opposite effect of what is intended: a standard of proof that renders the provision virtually inapplicable, a narrowing of the constitutional grounds, and an extension of the time limit for filing a lawsuit.

It is also important to keep the context in mind. In the summer of 2025, Law No. 4555-IX had already expanded Part 3 of Article 233 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, after which those changes were repealed. The issue swings back and forth like a pendulum, and such sharp fluctuations in and of themselves undermine legal certainty.