The President proposed that the Verkhovna Rada ratify the Convention on the Establishment of the International Compensation Commission for Ukraine. Legally, this means Ukraine’s consent to the Convention’s binding nature and the completion of the domestic procedures necessary for it to enter into force for Ukraine.
The explanatory note to Bill No. 0371 explicitly states that the convention serves as the basis for the establishment and operation of the International Compensation Commission as the second component of the international compensation mechanism.The first component of this mechanism is already the Register of Damages, which collects claims and evidence regarding the harm caused by the Russian Federation’s aggression. The new commission, however, is intended to take this process to the next level: not merely recording losses, but reviewing claims, evaluating them, and determining the amount of compensation in each case.
The Convention, adopted on December 16, 2025, in The Hague, explicitly establishes that the commission is an independent administrative body within the institutional framework of the Council of Europe. Its mandate covers damage, losses, or harm caused by internationally wrongful acts of the Russian Federation in Ukraine or against Ukraine since February 24, 2022, and claimants may include individuals, legal entities, and the State of Ukraine itself, including government authorities and state institutions.
The main advantage of the bill is that it shifts the issue of war damages from the realm of political declarations to that of an international institution with a defined mandate. The convention is based on the premise that the Russian Federation bears international legal responsibility for the damage caused, and the commission will have the authority to make final decisions on claims.
This is an important step toward establishing a legitimate international mechanism that could be linked to a compensation fund in the future.
In other words, this is not a symbolic act, but rather the establishment of a procedure through which documented losses can be transformed into formalized decisions on compensation.
However, one should not overestimate the immediate impact of ratification. The convention has not yet entered into force. For this to happen, at least 25 signatories must agree to its binding nature, and the combined contributions of these signatories to the registry’s budget must total at least 3,692,150 euros—that is, 50% of the registry’s total budget.
Therefore, Bill No. 0371 does not, in and of itself, trigger automatic payments. It brings Ukraine into an international treaty framework that has yet to become fully operational.
Another positive aspect is that the convention provides for a sufficiently broad institutional framework: the commission will have international legal personality, its own governing bodies, procedures, a secretariat, and an office in Ukraine. This means that the mechanism is designed not as a one-time political initiative, but as a separate international institution with the potential for long-term operation. At the same time, this offers an opportunity for a systematic review of the large number of claims already accumulating in the Register of Damages.
But there are also risks. First, a significant portion of the practical rules has not yet been enshrined directly in the text of the convention but will be determined later by the commission’s rules and regulations. It is these rules and regulations that will establish standards of proof, rules for assessing damages, approaches to compensation, and the order in which claims are considered. Thus, parliament is ratifying a framework, not a fully developed mechanism.
Second, the convention grants the commission very broad discretion. It considers not only factual and legal issues, but also procedural, financial, and even political matters necessary for reaching a decision. At the same time, the commission’s decisions are defined as final and not subject to further appeal or review. For an international compensation mechanism, this is understandable logic, but for claimants, it means a high degree of dependence on the quality of the initial procedures and the future internal rules of the commission itself.
Third, there is also a financial consideration. Although the convention stipulates that member states, with the exception of the Russian Federation, are not obligated to finance the compensation payments themselves, until Russia covers the commission’s expenses, its work will be funded through annual mandatory and voluntary contributions from members.
The explanatory note to the draft law explicitly acknowledges that Ukraine’s participation in the commission may require additional funding and even amendments to the state budget.
It is also worth noting another limiting factor: the commission’s decisions cannot be automatically enforced through the national courts of member states unless expressly permitted by the relevant national law. In other words, even after a decision on compensation is issued, the question of its actual enforcement will remain dependent on specific mechanisms, in particular on the future fund or political decisions regarding Russian assets.
Thus, Bill No. 0371 is an important and correct step, but it is not a “compensation law.” Its significance lies in creating an international legal framework within which the claims of Ukraine, its citizens, and businesses can take the form of official compensation rulings.
The strength of this step lies in its international legitimacy and the transition from merely recording losses to their legal determination. Its weakness lies in the delayed practical outcome: without the convention entering into force, without rules governing the commission’s operations, and without a separate funding mechanism, even the best decision risks remaining nothing more than a well-drafted legal document.
Author: Taras Onishchenko, attorney at Barristers, LLC
Source: https://zib.com.ua/ua/171821-zakonoproekt_0371_scho_same_ratifikue_ukraina_i_chi_nablizha.html