Against the backdrop of growing public demand to step up the fight against corruption under martial law, Bill No. 13673-1—drafted by a group of members of parliament led by Dmytro Razumkov—was submitted to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. 

Its aim is to provide a legislative response to the heightened public demand for stricter penalties for acts of corruption under martial law. The key provision of the bill is the addition of Article 111-3 to the Criminal Code of Ukraine (hereinafter—the Criminal Code of Ukraine), which establishes, for a number of corruption offenses committed by public officials holding positions of responsibility or special responsibility, a penalty of 15 years’ imprisonment or life imprisonment with confiscation of property.

However, despite its high-sounding slogans, this bill is legally untenable, as it merely creates the appearance of decisive action while ignoring fundamental principles of law. It is not a means of genuinely combating corruption, but rather a component of a political campaign that capitalizes on society’s desire for justice.

One of the most glaring flaws in the bill is that the proposed Article 111-3 effectively duplicates the provisions of existing articles of the Criminal Code of Ukraine, creating legal tautology.

An analysis of the provisions of Article 111-3 reveals near-complete identity with the existing provisions:

• Part 1 of Article 111-3 (Misappropriation, Embezzlement of Property) repeats the provisions of Article 191 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine.

• Part 2 of Article 111-3 (Misuse of Budget Funds) repeats the provisions of Article 210 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine.

• Part 3 of Article 111-3 (Abuse of Power or Official Position) replicates the provisions of Article 364 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine.

• Part 4 of Article 111-3 (Acceptance of an Unlawful Benefit) replicates the provisions of Article 368 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine.

• Part 5 of Article 111-3 (Illegal Enrichment) replicates the provisions of Article 368-5 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine.

• Part 6 of Article 111-3 (Abuse of Influence) replicates the provisions of Article 369-2 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine.

The only difference lies in the introduction of an aggravating circumstance—the commission of the act during a legal regime of martial law and its commission by a special subject — a person holding a responsible or particularly responsible position—as well as in the establishment of a single penalty for all such acts: imprisonment for a term of 15 years or life imprisonment, with confiscation of property.

This approach is flawed. Instead of creating a provision that is essentially identical—which violates the internal logic of the code— the legislature should have supplemented each of the aforementioned articles with a new paragraph that would provide for increased liability specifically in the presence of an aggravating circumstance—“committing the act during a legal regime of martial law.” 

The creation of parallel and essentially identical criminal offenses in different sections of the Criminal Code will inevitably lead to a conflict between criminal law provisions, legal uncertainty, and potential conflicts in the classification of acts.

Furthermore, the system of the Special Part of the Criminal Code of Ukraine is based on the classification of criminal offenses according to their generic object—the sphere of social relations protected by criminal law. Corruption offenses are traditionally placed in Section XVII, since their direct object is the established procedure for the performance of official duties and the authority of public authorities.

Draft Law No. 13673-1 proposes to place Article 111-3, which covers the elements of corruption offenses, in Section I, “Criminal Offenses Against the Foundations of Ukraine’s National Security.” This approach constitutes a gross violation of the doctrine of criminal law and the rules of legislative drafting. Although corruption may indirectly harm national security, its primary target is different.

This decision demonstrates a deliberate disregard for the systematic nature of the codified law in order to promote the political slogan “corruption equals treason.”

Moreover, the proposed provision establishes a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years’ imprisonment for six types of offenses that differ significantly in their degree of public danger. This directly contradicts the principle of individualized sentencing enshrined in Article 65 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine, which requires the court to take into account the severity of the criminal offense committed, the personality of the offender, and the circumstances that mitigate or aggravate the punishment.

The penalty proposed in the bill is clearly disproportionate. It equates liability for corruption offenses with liability for intentional homicide (Article 115 of the Criminal Code, 7 to 15 years), treason under martial law (Part 2 of Article 111 of the Criminal Code, 15 years or life imprisonment, with or without confiscation of property), and a terrorist act resulting in the death of a person (Part 3 of Article 258 of the Criminal Code, 10 to 15 years or life imprisonment, with or without confiscation of property). Such an equivalence undermines the hierarchy of values protected by criminal law, in which human life is the highest value.

Excessive severity can also have the opposite effect: judges faced with the choice between acquittal and imposing the minimum sentence of 15 years’ imprisonment for an offense that does not warrant such severity may be inclined to issue acquittals on formal grounds.

In addition to procedural aspects, this bill also violates other principles, in particular the fundamental principle of criminology, according to which the preventive function of criminal law is ensured primarily not by the severity of sanctions, but by the inevitability of criminal liability. In the fight against corruption in Ukraine, the key problem is not a lack of harsh penalties, but systemic flaws in the functioning of pretrial investigation and judicial review mechanisms.

Bill No. 13673-1 ignores this problem by proposing a “spectacular” yet misguided solution. Instead of comprehensive institutional reforms capable of ensuring genuine accountability, lawmakers are proposing only to increase penalties, which is effectively a diversionary tactic. Such actions create the illusion of fighting corruption without having any real impact on it.

Furthermore, the draft law provides for assigning the investigation of crimes under the new Article 111-3 to the exclusive jurisdiction of detectives from the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) by amending Article 216 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine.

Given that the perpetrators of these crimes are members of the state’s highest political and military leadership, granting NABU exclusive authority to investigate acts carrying such severe penalties creates an extremely powerful tool that could potentially be used to exert political pressure. The very fact of initiating a pretrial investigation under an article that is effectively equivalent to treason can have devastating reputational consequences for any political figure, regardless of the outcome of such a pretrial investigation or court proceedings. This creates risks of manipulation by anti-corruption agencies and undermines their credibility and public trust.

In summary, Bill No. 13673-1 is legally unfounded and flawed. It violates the principles of the systematization of criminal law, proportionality, and the individualization of punishment, and poses significant risks to political stability and the independence of the anti-corruption agency.

Lawmakers should focus on solving real problems and ensuring effective anti-corruption measures, rather than using draft laws as part of an election campaign. Their efforts should be directed toward systemic reforms capable of guaranteeing a genuine—rather than illusory—fight against corruption.